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6For the past two decades, historical epistemology has considerably stirred 
up the $ elds of philosophy and history of science. Around the mid 1990s 
several programmatic essays de$ ning the urge and e( ort to historicize epis-
temology appeared;1 three major international conferences followed (at the 
Max Planck Institute for the History of Science and at Columbia University 
in 2008 and at the K. U. Leuven in 2009); a survey introduction to the history 
and dominant problems of the approach was published in 2007;2 and, most 
importantly, an impressive and inspiring body of research developed in 
most cases within or in connection with the Max Planck Institute for the 
History of Science, which seems to be the leading proponent of the concept. 
On the other hand, one could also witness hesitant, cautious or outright 
critical reactions to these developments based especially on the conviction 
that there is no need for such a new agenda since both its subject and me-
thod are already contained within the tradition of philosophy and history 
of science.3 It is true that the program of historical epistemology was o) en 
formulated somewhat vaguely and perhaps too extensively – it is the nature 
of manifestos (even in academia) to be bold and ambitious. One positive 
e( ect of such declarations is that they lead to the reconsideration of funda-
mental assumptions and principles, provided the micro-political battles for 
demarcation and labeling are avoided. 
Although the title “Philosophy and History of Science” is usually used 
to designate one $ eld of academic research or training, the connection of 
philosophical and historical approaches to science is o) en mainly nominal. 
1  Namely, Lorraine DASTON, “Historical Epistemology.” In: CHANDLER, J. – DAVIDSON, 
A. I. –HAROOTUNIAN, H. D. (eds.), Questions of Evidence: Proof, Practice, and Persuasion 
Across Disciplines. Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1994, p.  282–289; Jürgen RENN, 
“Historical Epistemology and Interdisciplinarity.” Max Planck Institute for the History of 
Science Preprint 2, 1994; Jürgen RENN, “Historical Epistemology and the Advancement of 
Science.” Max Planck Institute for the History of Science Preprint 36, 1996.
2  Hans-Jörg RHEINBERGER, Historische Epistemologie zur Einführung. Hamburg: Junius 
Verlag 2007 (translated into English as On Historicizing Epistemology: An Essay. Stanford: 
Stanford University Press 2010).
3  Among the most relevant ones are * omas STURM, “Historical Epistemology or History 
of Epistemology? * e Case of the Relation between Perception and Judgment,” forthcoming 
in Erkenntnis, and Yves GINGRAS, “Naming without Necessity: On the Genealogy and Uses 
of the Label ‘Historical Epistemology’.” Revue de Synthèse, vol. 131, 2010, no. 3, p. 439–454.
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7In academic practice, we o) en encounter a distinct divergence, sometimes 
even antagonism between philosophical analysis and historical description, 
between theoretical formalism and ahistorical methodology of philosophy 
on the one hand and descriptive empiricism and narrow specialization of 
the history of (natural and technical) sciences on the other.
“Historical Epistemology” represents a critical alternative to the tradi-
tional philosophy and history of science especially in its e( ort to overcome 
this segregation. It is an approach, which situates itself within this tradi-
tional $ eld and draws on its accomplishments and contributions, yet tries 
to re-emphasize its central problems and issues in productive interfacing 
of history and theory. It attempts to disclose the basic knowledge form-
ing mechanisms in di( erent historical epochs, interpret scienti$ c thought 
within its cultural and social contexts, and pay attention to the interdiscipli-
nary relationships among di( erent disciplines as well as to the relationships 
between the scienti$ c and non-scienti$ c ways of thinking. 
If it should be possible at all to formulate a theory of scienti$ c thinking in its 
interdependence with other areas of human culture, than it must be a develop-
mental theory which does not separate scienti$ c from non-scienti$ c thinking 
in any absolute way, but which deals with the emergence of scienti$ c thinking 
within its cultural and social contexts. It is only in this perspective that the 
tensions between the philosophy and history of science, between internalism 
and contextualism, between the essence and the appearance of science, between 
its rational and its irrational moments can be conceivably addressed within 
a single theoretical framework.4
In its attempt to deal with the emergence and development of scienti$ c 
thinking within its cultural and social contexts, historical epistemology 
proceeds through a  conceptual integration of a  variety of heterogeneous 
subdisciplines. * is approach is motivated not only by the lost faith in the 
centrality of language and logic for understanding science as it was pro-
claimed by analytical philosophy, but also and most importantly by the 
present state of science, which can be dealt with by the traditional methods 
only with great di+  culties and limitations. Vis-à-vis the transformations of 
contemporary sciences, it is necessary that the methods of studying them 
adapt and transform as well:
4  RENN, “Historical Epistemology and Interdisciplinarity,” p. 3–4.
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8* e fast-paced rise, decline, and recombination of scienti$ c disciplines and 
departments indicates that Kuhn’s concept of paradigm is no longer descriptive 
of most current scienti$ c practices (which, in fact, are increasingly modeled 
through notions such as networks, assemblages, experimental systems, trading 
zones, and so on). […] * e sciences are moving toward organizing their practi-
tioners around problems, not disciplines, in clusters that may be too short-lived 
to be institutionalized into departments or programs or to be given lasting 
disciplinary labels.5
In this sense, we don’t understand historical epistemology as a successor 
to the traditional $ elds of philosophy and history of science but rather as an 
opportunity to address afresh some pressing problems of these $ elds within 
this newly recon$ gured regime of knowledge.
Historical inspirational sources of historical epistemology
* e main body of work constituting historically an approach that might be 
(and sometimes is) called historical epistemology is the French tradition 
of philosophy and history of science (Bachelard, Cavaillès, Koyre, Cangui-
lhem), culminating in the works of Michel Foucault.6 * eir reorientation of 
focus on science and knowledge rises from a critique of transcendentalist 
philosophies of science (established by Kant and propagated by such diverse 
approaches as phenomenology or logical positivism), which seek to justify 
logical and methodological norms by deriving them from foundational acts 
of consciousness. Systems of knowledge are rather constituted within social 
contexts, maintained by power relations, and guided by matrices governing 
the space of possible statements that occur in the writings of a given histori-
cal age. It is the shi) ing away from assigning a central epistemological role 
to the conscious acts of subjects what de$ nes the core of historical episte-
mology, although the stress on language, which replaces it in the works of 
Foucault and others is equally open to questions.
5  Mario BIAGIOLI, “Postdisciplinary Liaisons: Science Studies and the Humanities.” Critical 
Inquiry, vol. 35, 2009, no. 2, p. 819.
6  On the relationship of these $ gures to the contemporary perspectives in historical 
epistemology, see for example David HYDER, “Foucault, Cavaillès, and Husserl on the 
Historical Epistemology of the Sciences.” Perspectives on Science, vol. 11, 2003, no. 1, p. 107–129 
and Hans-Jörg RHEINBERGER, “Gaston Bachelard and the Notion of ‘Phenomenotechnique’.” 
Perspectives on Science, vol. 13, 2005, no. 3, p. 313–328.
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9Other two important discourses feeding the approach of historical 
epistemology are social epistemology (or the sociology of knowledge, or the 
sociology of scienti$ c knowledge) and comparative epistemology. Although 
they both have brought important correctives to the traditional philosophi-
cal epistemology (especially the emphasis upon the relationship between 
cognition and social structure), they avoid the historicity of knowledge, tend 
to treat cognitive styles as static structures and to underestimate the role of 
particular individuals in the evolution of thought and science. 
Primitive Classi) cation by Durkheim and Mauss from 19037 contains 
the $ rst attempt at analyzing the societal origins of the categories of the 
mind. * eir attack on traditional epistemology (namely Hume and Kant) 
stems from the conviction that human categories and processes of classi-
$ cation are always social in origin and therefore closely re' ect the social 
organization of particular societies. * eir work, however, as well as the 
works of others who more or less critically proceed from them (mainly in the 
$ elds of anthropology and ethnography), focuses primarily on pre-modern 
or generally non-scienti$ c modes of thought and so proceeds only half-way: 
the categories and classi$ cations of modern science need to be relativized in 
terms of cultural matrixes as well.
Ludwik Fleck’s pioneering study on the genesis and development 
of scienti$ c facts8 provided in 1935 such an elaboration and extension of 
Durkheim’s approach, substituting the concept of the thought collective 
for his social group and the thought style for his collective representations. 
Although Fleck’s work had not been much in' uential at the time of its $ rst 
publication, it found its echo later in the historical turn in the philosophy of 
science, as well as at the emphasis upon institutional analysis.9
* e general resources of historical epistemology have been also substan-
tially in' uenced by the historical turn in the philosophy of science, particu-
larly by the work of historians of science such as Kuhn, Lakatos, Laudan, 
Feyerabend. Especially Kuhn’s ! e Structure of Scienti) c Revolutions10 and 
7  Émile DURKHEIM – Marcel MAUSS, Primitive Classi) cation. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press 1967.
8  Ludwik FLECK, ! e Genesis and Development of the Scienti) c Fact. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press 1981.
9  Mary DOUGLAS, How Institutions ! ink. Syracuse University Press 1986; Jonathan 
TURNER – Stephen TURNER, ! e Impossible Science: An Institutional Analysis of American 
Sociology. Newbury Park: Sage 1990.
10  * omas KUHN, ! e Structure of Scienti) c Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press 1962 as well as * omas KUHN, ! e Essential Tension. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press 1977 and * omas KUHN, “* e Natural and the Human Sciences.” In: HILEY, D. H. – 
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! e Criticicism and the Growth of Knowledge edited by Lakatos11 have been 
central to the reformulation of ideas such as knowledge accumulation, 
progress, advancement, and structural organization of (natural) science – 
subsequently adopted and developed by the social and human scientists.12
Epistemological concerns of the philosophers of science before the historical 
turn had been consolidated in the search for foundational, ahistorical and 
universal grounds for knowledge, with implying denial of history in the 
construction of theoretical, methodological, and epistemological accounts. 
Social and human scientists principally celebrated “the turn to history,” 
since it appeared much more suited to general problems of their disciplines, 
regardless of Kuhn’s own claim that no implications should be drawn from 
his historiography of the natural sciences for the realm of other sciences. 
In terms of historical epistemology, one of the crucial discrepancies 
arises from the fact that unlike the human sciences where histories of 
particular sciences, or disciplines, are written mostly by practitioners in 
the $ eld, histories of natural sciences on the whole have been produced by 
historians of science using completely di( erent methods, research tools and 
evidence than those exercised in the $ eld they studied. * is methodological 
self–awareness is re' ected in the work of historical epistemologists and in 
this context it has to be said that historical epistemology avoids construct-
ing “content-independent” methodology typical of traditional history of 
science.13 It uses comparative-historical analysis not for the purpose of se-
curing research tools (in its case mostly referring to questions of evaluation 
of archival evidence) exploitable across particular disciplines independently 
of the object under study, but in order to refer to some common issues of the 
human sciences (e. g. concept formation, formation of conceptual schemes, 
BOHMAN, J. E. – SHUSTERMAN, R. (eds.), ! e Interpretive Turn. Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press 1991. See also Mary HESSE, Revolutions and Reconstructions in the Philosophy of Science. 
Harvester Press 1980.
11  Imre LAKATOS – Alan MUSGRAVE (eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1970.
12  Charles TAYLOR, “Interpretation and the Sciences of Man.” Review of Metaphysics, vol. 
25, 1971, no. 1, p. 3–51; Barry BARNES, T. S. Kuhn and Social Science. New York: Columbia 
University Press 1982; Steve FULLER, ! omas Kuhn: A Philosophical History of Our Times.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press 2000.
13  Marx WARTOFSKY, “Epistemology Historicized.” In: SHIMONY, A. – NAILS, D. (eds.), 
Naturalistic Epistemology. Dordrecht: D. Reidel 1987, p.  357–374; Margaret M. SOMERS, 
“Where Is Sociology a) er the Historic Turn? Knowledge Cultures, Narrativity and Historical 
Epistemologies.” In: McDONALD, T. (ed.), ! e Historic Turn in the Human Sciences. Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press 1996.
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representation, rationality, relativism, re' exivity, intellectual and theoreti-
cal coherence, narration and knowledge, etc.). 
In the area of the social and human sciences, these common issues are 
now usually approached by means of studying historical – intellectual and 
institutional – contexts, in which particular dominant ideas, knowledge cul-
tures, thought styles, frames of reference have been formed. In contrast with 
earlier forms of historical analysis, which primarily focused on interpreting, 
rationalizing, disproving, or advocating various speci$ c ideas, values, or at-
titudes, the “new” practices tend to approach this research material in such 
a manner that they situate the ideas, values or attitudes within their own 
historical, cultural, and material context. Studying how ideas are appearing, 
transforming, dismantling, or re-emerging, delivers new additives into his-
torical narratives about the social and human sciences, such as the impact 
of local institutional factors, personal bonds, the position of the social and 
human sciences in the global structure of universities, the interdisciplinary 
interaction among particular disciplines, etc.14 
Within the realms of both traditional philosophy and history of science 
and contemporary historical epistemology, the main focus is overwhelm-
ingly slanted towards the natural and technical sciences:
* at is the source of both problems and examples, and, insofar as even the 
social sciences $ gure in such analyses, they appear as pale imitations of the 
natural sciences. Except for some older work on hermeneutics [...] and one study 
of the history of footnotes (by Anthony Gra) on), there is almost nothing on 
the epistemology and practices of the humanists. Historians of science have 
written about how biologists learned to see under the microscope, how bota-
nists learned to characterize plants in succinct Latin, how physicists learned to 
abstract from messy phenomena to mathematical models. [...] But what about 
an epistemology based upon the practices of humanists, on what they do?15
14  * is approach is developed and utilized, for example, in the following texts: Charles CAMIC, 
“* ree Departments in Search of a Discipline: Localism and Interdisciplinary Interaction in 
American Sociology, 1890–1940.” Social Research, vol. 62, 1995, no. 4, p. 1003–1032; Charles 
CAMIC – Yu XIE, “* e Statistical Turn in American Social Science: Columbia University, 
1890 to 1915.” American Sociological Review, vol. 59, 1994, no. 5, p. 773–805; Christian FLECK, 
A Transatlantic History of the Social Sciences: Robber Barons, the ! ird Reich and the Invention 
of Empirical Social Research. London: Bloomsbury Academic 2011; Roger L. GEIGER, To 
Advance Knowledge: ! e Growth of American Research Universities, 1900–1940. New York: 
Oxford University Press 1986; Mark C. SMITH, Social Science in the Crucible: ! e American 
Debate over Objectivity and Purpose. Durham, NC: Duke University Press 1994.
15  Lorraine DASTON, “Whither Critical Inquiry?” Critical Inquiry, vol. 30, 2004, no. 4, p. 363.
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As regards the epistemology and the practices of the human sciences, 
three main research areas can be identi$ ed. 
& ought styles and thought collectives
According to Fleck, the “thought style” (an elaboration on Durkheim’s con-
cept of “collective representation”) sets the preconditions of any cognition 
and determines what can be counted as a reasonable question and a true or 
a false answer. It provides the context and sets the limits for any judgment 
about objective reality. Its essential feature is to be hidden from the members 
of the though collective – the thought style exerts compulsive force upon 
their thinking, which they are hardly ever aware of. * e notion of thought 
style16 is related to the traditional idea of a  “conceptual scheme” and to 
Renn’s concept of “cultural systems of knowledge;”17 these concepts help to 
comprise both external and internal aspects of the development of science 
and to analyze the cognitive structures of knowledge and their forms of so-
cial transmission in conjunction. * e notions of thought style and thought 
collective – which themselves are locally speci$ c, although their identities 
transformed dramatically under the conditions of globalization – have to be 
applied distinctively to the di( erent sciences. 
From another position, the problem of the local speci$ city of knowledge 
has also been addressed by anthropology and post-colonial theory,18 in 
which the spatial and temporal perspectives merge in delimiting areas and 
historical conditions of non-Western modes of knowledge that have been 
subjugated by the universalizing claims of Western science. In response to 
these claims, some authors attempt to show that “Western science, like all 
knowledge in all societies, is inherently local,”19 while others choose to treat 
indigenous knowledge as “local science.”20 * e notion of local science should 
not, however, imply spatially bounded and static form of knowledge. As Ed-
16  Mary DOUGLAS, ! ought Styles: Critical Essays on Good Taste. London: Sage 1996.
17  RENN, “Historical Epistemology and the Advancement of Knowledge.”
18  See Cli( ord GEERTZ, Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology. New 
York: Basic Books 1983.
19  David TURNBULL, Masons, Tricksters and Cartographers: Comparative Studies in the 
Sociology of Scienti) c and Indigenous Knowledge. Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publisher 
2000, p. 38. See also Laura NADER, Naked Science: Anthropological Inquiry into Boundaries, 
Power, and Knowledge. London: Routledge 1996.
20  Paul SILLITOE, “Local Science vs Global Science: an Overview.” in: Paul SILLITOE 
(ed.), Local Science Vs Global Science: Approaches to Indigenous Knowledge in International 
Development. New York: Berghahn Books 2007, p. 1–39.
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ward Said suggested, “like people and schools of criticism, ideas and theories 
travel.”21 * e concept of traveling theories thus allows for consideration of 
not only the history, but also of the trajectory or dislocation of knowledge. 
Itself a productive strand of inquiry, the post-colonial concept of local sci-
ence may thus become yet another item in the intellectual exchange between 
post-colonial and post-socialist paradigms that has been advocated in recent 
academic debates.
Conceptual and theoretical levels of knowledge
* e shi)  from the foundational discourse of scienti$ c knowledge to the 
cultural system of knowledge – could be brought together with the problems 
of interdisciplinarity,22 demarcation, uni$ cation, and identi$ cation of pro-
blems not in their “context- independent” and repeatedly programmatic 
form, but in their practical implications for the human sciences. Historical 
contextualization of these problems suggests that particular disciplines of 
the human sciences are very o) en separated not by their methods, research 
tools or knowledge claims and interests, but by the culture of thinking, 
writing, discovering, etc., which are – taken historically – relatively deeply 
structured.23 
Emphasis is in this context also placed on the practice of concept forma-
tion in the human sciences, both in its general – the very idea of the concept 
of concept enabling the process of inquiry itself –, and in its practical im-
plication engrained in the idea of conceptual standardization (and also in 
the idea of fundamental concepts). * e perspective of historical epistemol-
ogy points to the necessity for an analysis of conceptual schemes imposing 
boundaries on the culture of writing and the practice of argumentation in 
the human sciences.
In earlier forms of epistemological inquiries, the theoretical structures 
of knowledge have been conceived of as the antithesis of history. In historical 
21  Edward SAID, ! e World, the Text, and the Critic. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press 1983, p. 226.
22  See, for example, Stephen P. TURNER, “What Are Disciplines? And How Is Interdisciplinarity 
Di( erent?” In: WEINGART, P. – STEHR, N. (eds.), Practicing Interdisciplinarity. Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press 2000, p. 46–65.
23  See, for example, Laurel RICHARDSON, Writing Strategies: Reaching Diverse Audiences. 
Newburry Park: Sage 1990; and George STEINMETZ (ed.), ! e Politics of Method in the Human 
Sciences: Positivism and Its Epistemological Others. Durham – London: Duke University Press 
2005.
Historical Epistemology Meets the Human Sciences
14
epistemology, the idea of theoretical coherence is systematically confronted 
with the relativist claims resulting from the unavailing past search for a syn-
thesis at the level of theoretical, methodological, conceptual, and substantive 
concerns of science. An analysis of the theoretical structures of knowledge is 
at the very centre of interest of historical epistemology where it is contrasted 
with narrative descriptivism of the new social and cultural studies of science 
displacing any idea of theoretical coherence from their knowledge interests. 
& e material culture of science
Concepts, problems, and ideas have been traditionally accepted as the main 
“material” of science. Consequently, studying science and its history meant 
$ rst of all reading and interpreting books or articles. In the past few decades, 
more and more scholars have striven to surpass such textualism by embra-
cing much wider spectrum of materials, focusing on instruments, artifact 
collections, experiments, representations and visualizations, methods of ob-
servation and intervention, etc.24 Within the histories of the natural sciences 
this shi)  helped to overcome the two separate and sometimes antagonistic 
approaches – one focusing on ideas and being practiced in academic circles, 
the other focusing on instruments and technologies and being the domain 
of scienti$ c and technological museums. Within the realm of the human 
sciences, the situation is more complicated since it is – again – the various 
forms of texts we have to deal with. Yet it is possible to conceive of texts (be 
they codex bound tractates or collaborative hypertexts) as material embodi-
ments of knowledge as well: they are objects that contain and transfer ideas 
as well as shape and condition them.
Studying the materiality of scienti$ c texts means studying the tech-
niques and practices of production, use and distribution of texts, their 
structures and visual organization at the intersections of science studies, 
literature studies, and the histories of print culture and media.25 Apart from 
24  Peter GALISON, Image and Logic. A Material Culture of Microphysics. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press 1997; Hans-Jörg RHEINBERGER, Towards a History of Epistemic ! ings: 
Synthesizing Proteins in the Test Tube. Stanford: Stanford University Press 1997; * omas 
HANKINS – Robert SILVERMAN, Instruments and the Imagination. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press 1999; Lorraine DASTON, Biographies of Scienti) c Objects. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press 2000; Davis BAIRD, ! ing Knowledge. A Philosophy of Scienti) c 
Instruments. University of California Press 2004; Lorraine DASTON – Peter GALISON, 
Objectivity. New York: Zone Books 2007.
25  Timothy LENOIR (ed.), Inscribing Science. Scienti) c Texts and the Materiality of 
Communiation. Stanford: Stanford University Press 1998.
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focusing on the di( erent forms of writing, which are embedded within an 
entire economy of signs and thus constitutive of meaning rather than a pas-
sive medium for restoring the presence of language to thought,26 or on the 
literariness of scienti$ c texts,27 the attention is also paid to the conventions 
and institutions associated with the scienti$ c enterprise, such as are the no-
tions of authorship, originality, plagiarism, argumentation, co-production, 
etc. It is not only the technologies of inscriptions themselves that constitute 
meaning but also the wider social context of scienti$ c practice,28 such as the 
historically and locally particular scienti$ c policy or method of evaluation.
More speci$ cally, also the systematic interest in the historical develop-
ment of material practices of reading and writing scienti$ c texts and their 
interrelations with the conceptual architectures of these texts and at the 
transformations of the scienti$ c “work” in its embodied forms with special 
emphasis on the ways the traditional genres (monograph, article, lecture, 
presentation) mutate in the electronic environment may potentially become 
an integrative part of the historical epistemology’s research agenda.29
In the above stated account of the recent developments within a rela-
tively newly emerging $ eld of historical epistemology, we tried to draw 
attention to the possibilities stemming from research practices being set 
up with a  promise to overcome traditional forms of historical analysis 
established in particular disciplines. * e typical histories of the social and 
human sciences have usually been expressed in the form of textbooks, the-
matic anthologies, or readers, and were designed to produce, or reconstruct, 
disciplinary canons enabling to summarize the work of eminent $ gures, 
encapsulate previous knowledge, identify dominant ideas, theories, meth-
ods, and concepts, which would pro$ le and integrate both the disciplinary 
26  Jacques DERRIDA, Of Grammatology. Baltimore: * e Johns Hopkins University Press 1998; 
Friedrich KITTLER, Discourse Networks 1800/1900. Stanford: Stanford University Press 1990.
27  Hayden WHITE, Metahistory: ! e Historical Imagination in the Nineteenth-Century Europe. 
Baltimore: * e Johns Hopkins University Press 1975; Hayden WHITE, Tropics of Discourse: 
Essays in Cultural Criticism. Baltimore: * e Johns Hopkins University Press 1986.
28  Bruno LATOUR – Steve WOOLGAR, Laboratory Life: ! e Construction of Scienti) c Facts. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press 1986.
29  Henry JENKINS, “* e Work of * eory in the Age of Digital Transformation.” In: MILLER, 
T. – STAM, R. (eds.), A Companion to Film ! eory. Malden: Blackwell 2004; George LANDOW, 
Hypertext: ! e Convergence of Contemporary Critical ! eory and Technology. Baltimore: * e 
Johns Hopkins University Press 1991; Geo( rey NUNBERG, ! e Future of the Book. Berkeley: 
University of California Press 1996; Willard McCARTY, “Being Reborn: * e Humanities, 
Computing and Styles of Scienti$ c Reasoning.” New Technology in Medieval and Renaissance 
Studies, 2007, no. 1, p. 1–23.
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agenda and coordinate the future activities of the practitioners in the $ eld. 
* e approach endorsed in the programmatic texts written by proponents 
of historical epistemology does not promise to resolve the traditional pre-
sentist/historicist dilemma. Rather, it seeks to identify the intersections of 
particular disciplinary practices, academic cultures, knowledge cultures, or 
thought styles. Probably most importantly, it commits itself to the questions 
of the transformations of the scienti$ c “work” in relation to the historically 
very deeply rooted notions, prerequisites, and requirements of the scienti$ c 
“activity” as such. In the area of the human sciences, these concerns seem 
particularly acute, given the questionable and fragile epistemological foun-
dation they have always had.
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